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INTRODUCTION
The ability of sexual predators to communicate with children online is
at an all-time high.1 This is largely due to children’s increased access to the
internet.2 Children and teens today are using the internet for very different
purposes than they were thirty years ago in the 1990s, contributing to their
increased vulnerability.3 Instead of chat rooms and instant messaging,
today’s children and teens utilize social media applications like Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat. 4 These modern social media platforms
permit children to publicize much more personal information, allowing
predators to easily obtain details about a child’s likes, dislikes, activity and
behavior.5 Children who spend more time online are also more vulnerable––

1

See Chapter Seventeen: The Real Numbers and Increasing Online Dangers, KIDSLIVES AFE,
http://www.kidslivesafe.com/child-safety/online-predators-and-cyberbullying-statistics
[https://perma.cc/QE9U-4S8S] (“The number of sexual predators and online sexual offenses has more
than doubled in the last three years, with more than 82% of online sex crimes originating from social
networking sites that predators use to gain insight into their victim’s habits and likes.”).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See Instagram and Snapchat are Most Popular Social Networks for Teens; Black Teens Are Most
Active on Social Media, Messaging Apps, ASSOCIATED PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (Apr.
2017),
http://apnorc.org/projects/Pages/Instagram-and-Snapchat-are-Most-Popular-Social-Networksfor-Teens.aspx [https://perma.cc/54YK-PZYZ] (reporting American teen use of social media applications
at 76% for Instagram, 75% for Snapchat, 66% for Facebook, and 47% for Twitter).
5
See Lysa Myers, How Do We Protect Kids From Online Predators?, WELIVE SECURITY (Nov. 27,
2013, 5:59 PM), https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/11/27/how-do-we-protect-kids-from-onlinepredators [https://perma.cc/8UH9-XA2U] (“[Sixty-five percent] of online sex offenders used the victim’s
social networking site to gain home and school information about the victim.”); Social Media, Mobile
Phones and Sexting, INTERNET SAFETY 101, http://internetsafety101.org/Socialmediastats
[https://perma.cc/X9WJ-J4M2] (reporting that 93% of teen Facebook users share their real names, 92%
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there is a direct correlation between a teenager’s level of isolation and how
much time they spend online. 6 This isolation is often caused by low selfesteem and antisocial tendencies, significantly increasing the child’s
susceptibility to an unwanted sexual advance.7 Nonprofits and child
protective groups have urged parents to keep a closer eye on their children
and teens.8 Unfortunately, however, the growing number of online sex
crimes shows that parents’ efforts to monitor their children’s internet usage
are insufficient. 9 Federal and state governments have responded to the risk
posed by sexual predators by enacting laws criminalizing the solicitation of
minors to engage in sexual acts. 10 These solicitation laws protect minors by
criminalizing the invitation to engage in sexual conduct, therefore preventing
any harm from occurring before the offender makes physical contact with a
child.11
In the past decade, various states have begun criminalizing “grooming”
speech, which is the speech leading up to the solicitation of a sexual act with

share pictures of themselves, 21% share their personal cell phone numbers, and 25% share videos of
themselves).
6
Elana T. Jacobs, Online Sexual Solicitation of Minors: An Analysis of the Average Predator, His
Victims, What Is Being Done and Can Be Done to Decrease Occurrences of Victimization, 10 CARDOZO
P UB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 505, 536 (2012).
7
Id.
8
See, e.g., Tips For Parents: Setting Physical Boundaries, NAT’ L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED
CHILDREN
(2017),
http://www.kidsmartz.org/~/media/KidSmartz/ResourceDocuments/
KidSmartz_Setting_Physical_Boundaries.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQW-VM2M] (teaching children they
have the right to say no to adults, even when it makes them uncomfortable, which helps them establish
protective boundaries); Irene van der Zande, Four Strategies for Protecting Kids from Sexual Predators,
KIDPOWER (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.kidpower.org/library/article/protecting-kids-from-sexualpredators [https://perma.cc/CZ8V-CL86] (describing preventative measures adults can take, such as
being a good listener, practicing safety skills, and putting safety concerns ahead of embarrassment or
inconvenience); Victim Grooming: Protect Your Child from Sexual Predators, BOYS TOWN,
http://www.boystown.org/parenting/article/Pages/victim-grooming-protect-your-child-from-sexualpredators.aspx [https://perma.cc/439C-UQ7G] (discussing how becoming knowledgeable about the
“grooming process” and being able to recognize signs of grooming can protect a child from sexual
predators). Furthermore, one in three parents say that they have had concerns or questions about their
child’s technology use in 2014. Maeve Duggan et al., Concerns about Children, Social Media and
Technology Use, PEW RES. CTR. (July 16, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/07/16/concernsabout-children-social-media-and-technology-use/#fn-13873-24 [https://perma.cc/X75K-4X2H].
9
See KIDSLIVESAFE, supra note 1.
10
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1982) (examining a statute targeting child
pornography and finding that the State’s interest in preventing sexual exploitation of minors is a
“government objective of surpassing importance”); see also Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children from
Speech, 57 F LA. L. REV. 565, 607–08 (2005) (examining the government’s interest in protecting children
from harmful speech).
11
See infra note 12.
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a minor. 12 Grooming occurs when an adult intentionally befriends a minor 13
and establishes an emotional connection in order to lower the minor’s
inhibitions in preparation for illegal sexual contact. 14 Grooming can be done
online or face-to-face,15 and the process includes various stages. 16 When done
12
Illinois and Arkansas have expressly prohibited grooming via state statute. See 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/11-25 (2012) (“Grooming”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-307 (2013) (“Sexually Grooming a
Child”). Other states, such as Texas and Oregon, have statutes that effectively prohibit grooming
behavior. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.021 (West 2015) (“Online Solicitation of a Minor”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 167.057 (2016) (“Luring a Minor”). Indiana and Georgia prohibit communications related
to or describing sexual conduct if made with the intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire. See IND. CODE
§ 35-42-4-13 (2014) (“Inappropriate Communication with a Child”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.2(e)
(2017) (“Computer or Electronic Pornography and Child Exploitation Prevention Act of 2007”).
13
The jury is the ultimate fact finder when it comes to determining whether the defendant intended
to establish a sexual relationship or a legal, appropriate one. However, experts and psychologists have
developed lists of behaviors that suggest that an inappropriate relationship was intended, including: (1)
giving the child a secret phone or tablet; (2) sudden excessive messaging; (3) buying the child gifts or
treats; (4) flattering the child by claiming to have the same likes and interests; (5) telling dirty jokes; (6)
claiming to be “best friends” with the child; and (7) touching or hugging the child in front of trusted adults
to make the child think the touching is okay. See Kristen Jenson, #MeToo –– 10 Ways Predators Are
Grooming Kids, PROTECT YOUNG MINDS (Oct. 26, 2017), https://protectyoungminds.org/2017/10/26/10ways-predators-grooming-kids/ [https://perma.cc/P3R4-RYA3]. Looking at whether these behaviors
combine to form a pattern can help a jury decide whether the defendant is guilty of grooming or just
simply being friendly with a child.
14
See Online Grooming, INHOPE, http://www.inhope.org/gns/internet-concerns/overview-of-theproblem/online-grooming.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8FD-CR7X] (defining the child grooming process as
“actions deliberately undertaken with the aim of befriending and establishing an emotional connection
with a child, in order to lower the child’s inhibitions in preparation for sexual activity with the child”).
To groom a child, a pedophile must have a way of effectively communicating with that child in private.
Id. Because communication over the internet is perceived as anonymous, children often feel a false sense
of security, even though the children often do not know to whom they are talking. Id. After gaining online
access to the child, the predator is often skilled at eliciting as much personal information as possible about
the minor, such as the minor’s home address, current and past locations, interests, and friends. Id.
Eventually, the predator is able to undermine the minor’s reluctance to participate in sexual acts by asking
about the child’s sexual experiences and subsequently showing him or her child pornography. Id.
15
See Grooming: What It Is, Signs and How to Protect Children, NSPCC,
https://www.nspcc.org.uk/preventing-abuse/child-abuse-and-neglect/grooming/
[https://perma.cc/
6WEA-WHB9] (“Children and young people can be groomed online or face-to-face, by a stranger or by
someone they know - for example a family member, friend or professional.”); see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae, Minn. Coal. Against Sexual Assault at 3–5, 14, Minnesota v. Muccio, 881 N.W.2d 149 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2016) (No. A15-1951), 2016 WL 3924135 (describing the grooming process and facts
suggesting that Muccio attempted to groom her victim at school face-to-face and at home via cell phone
messages).
16
Studies suggest these stages include friendship and relationship-forming, exclusivity/isolation, and
the sexual stage. See Georgia M. Winters & Elizabeth L. Jeglic, Stages of Sexual Grooming: Recognizing
Potentially Predatory Behaviors of Child Molesters, 38 DEVIANT BEHAV. 724, 725–27 (2017). Early
stages of grooming speech may “appear to be innocent in nature and typical of adult child interactions”
when viewed in isolation; however, when coupled with coercion, manipulation and the introduction or
constant reference to sexual themes, the intent to engage in a serious offense against a child is more
apparent. Id. at 725; see also Grooming Dynamic, N AT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/grooming-dynamic-of-csa
[https://perma.cc/78GK-YWU8] (“The perpetrator may observe the child and assesses his/her
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successfully, grooming a child increases the likelihood of engaging the child
in a sexual act because the child is more likely to trust the adult. 17 Grooming
also often causes the child to not report the sexual contact to other authority
figures, which allows predators to walk away from criminal conduct without
any consequences.18 For these reasons, grooming speech is especially
dangerous. However, while some states have enacted grooming statutes,
many are poorly written, and most states have no grooming statutes at all. 19
The need for grooming laws that protect against child predators is
imperative,20 but the modern-day use of the First Amendment to fight
regulations on speech is also strong. 21 Recently, the First Amendment’s free
speech clause has been successfully used to fight against laws in areas that
seem only tangentially related to speech, including election spending by
corporations,22 the baking of cakes by bakers, 23 and even unions’ extraction
of compulsory agency fees from nonmembers. 24 Because the First
Amendment defense has become so robust, courts have complete authority

vulnerabilities to learn how best to approach and interact with the child. Perpetrators may offer the victims
special attention, understanding and a sympathetic ear, and then engage the child in ways that eventually
gain their friendship and trust (they may play games with victims or give them rides, provide them with
gifts and/or special treats).”).
17
See Gregory M. Weber, Grooming Children for Sexual Molestation, ZERO,
http://www.vachss.com/guest_dispatches/grooming.html [https://perma.cc/7H39-AK6J] (“The forging
of an emotional bond through grooming leads to physical contact. Predators use the grooming process to
break down a child’s defenses and increase the child’s acceptance of touch. The first physical contact
between predator and victim is often nonsexual touching designed to identify limits: an ‘accidental’ touch,
an arm around the shoulder, a brushing of hair. Nonsexual touching desensitizes the child. It breaks down
inhibitions and leads to more overt sexual touching—the predator’s ultimate goal.”).
18
See INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE GROOMING OF CHILDREN FOR
SEXUAL P URPOSES: MODEL LEGISLATION & GLOBAL REVIEW 10 (2017) (“Through the grooming
process, an offender seeks to gain the child’s compliance to maintain secrecy, and to avoid detection and
punishment.”). Once the predator gains the emotional trust of the minor, the minor is prevented from
seeking out the protection of their parents, teachers, and other trusted adults. See Online Grooming, supra
note 1414.
19
See statutes cited supra note 12.
20
See supra notes 1–6.
21
See infra note 51.
22
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (finding that the free
speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from limiting spending for
communication by corporations).
23
See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(finding that the free speech clause of the First Amendment requires civil rights commissions to neutrally
consider charges of discrimination when a business owner refuses to provide creative services, such as a
wedding cake for a same-sex marriage).
24
See generally Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)
(finding that the free speech clause of the First Amendment prohibits labor unions from collecting fees
from nonunion members).
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to strike down newly enacted grooming laws unless such laws are written to
withstand a First Amendment challenge. 25
This Comment argues that states should criminalize grooming speech,
but only if the state statutes are carefully drafted to prevent their overbreadth.
In doing so, this Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides
background information regarding the current state of First Amendment
doctrine. Part II discusses a recent case, Minnesota v. Muccio,26 in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of an electronic
grooming statute. 27 In Part III, this Comment highlights some of the
challenges faced by the Minnesota legislature as a result of a poorly drafted
grooming law and provides guidance in the form of model legislation for
state legislatures to consider when drafting future laws. Part III also provides
a legal analysis to support the criminalization of grooming speech. This
Comment argues that grooming speech should be classified as an extension
of criminal solicitation and considered unprotected, proscribable speech in
the context of the First Amendment.
I.

A PRIMER ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment protects speech against government regulation. 28
However, there are three distinct ways that a statute regulating speech could
fail a First Amendment challenge: first, by falling into one of three categories
of unprotected speech; second, by violating the “overbreadth doctrine”; or
third, by failing strict scrutiny analysis as content-based discrimination. This
Part discusses each one of these in turn.
First, there are three types of speech that are unprotected and may be
regulated by either state or federal government: (1) speech communicated to
“induce or commence illegal activities”;29 (2) obscene speech;30 and (3) child

25

See infra Section III.B (referencing statutes in Oregon and Texas that were struck down).
Minnesota v. Muccio (Muccio II), 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328
(2017).
27
Id. at 919.
28
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”).
29
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (holding that “offers to engage in
illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection,” and therefore speech
that is “intended to induce or commence illegal activities” such as conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation
is not protected and has no constitutional value).
30
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (establishing a three-part test for assessing whether
material is obscene and therefore unprotected: “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value”) (internal citation omitted).
26
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pornography.31 The first unprotected category, “speech integral to criminal
conduct,” is relevant in the child predator context because when a predator
solicits a sexual act from a child, he is communicating in order to commence
an illegal activity—the sexual conduct. This allows legislatures to
criminalize the sexual solicitation of a minor before any act occurs. 32 Critics
of solicitation laws argue that the government should not have the ability to
regulate speech that merely suggests a criminal act might happen at a future
point in time. 33 In United States v. Williams,34 the U.S. Supreme Court found
an “important distinction between a proposal to engage in illegal activity and
the abstract advocacy of illegality.” 35 Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled in State v. Washington-Davis36 that a statute’s regulation of
solicitation speech survives a First Amendment challenge if that statute
“focus[es] on speech directly related to criminal behavior.”37 If the speech
regulated is not “focused,” then it does not fall into the unprotected category
of speech, and a court may strike the law down.
Second, a statute can fail a First Amendment challenge under the
“substantial overbreadth doctrine,”38 which the Court developed to address
facial challenges to the First Amendment. 39 The goal of the overbreadth
31
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758, 764 (1982) (adding child pornography as an additional
category of speech excluded from First Amendment protection and finding that child pornography causes
substantial harm to children and therefore has no value).
32
Because a predator is effectively communicating in order to commence an illegal activity when he
solicits a sexual act from a child, the “speech integral to criminal conduct” category allows legislatures
to criminalize the sexual solicitation of a minor before any such act occurs. See Eugene Volokh, The
“Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1030 (2016) (explaining
that sexual solicitation of a minor laws are akin to statutes that criminalize constitutionally unprotected
attempt of a crime).
33
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The government may not prohibit
speech because it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future
time.’”).
34
553 U.S. 285 (2008).
35
Id. at 298–99.
36
881 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 2016).
37
Id. at 538.
38
See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255 (“The overbreadth doctrine prohibits the Government from
banning unprotected speech if a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or chilled in the
process.”); see also Minnesota v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998) (“A statute is overbroad
on its face if it prohibits constitutionally protected activity, in addition to activity that may be prohibited
without offending constitutional rights.”).
39
There are two categories of First Amendment challenges: “as-applied” and “facial” challenges. See
Doug Linder, The Doctrines of Substantial Overbreadth and Vagueness, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2019), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/overbreadth.html [https://perma.cc/
T5DB-ETWY] (explaining the doctrine of substantial overbreadth as having two categories of challenges:
“as applied” and “facial”). An as-applied challenge is typically described as one where the statute, “even
though generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of the plaintiff’s
particular circumstances.” Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. &
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doctrine is to ensure that the government does not enact a law that
inadvertently bans a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech.40 The doctrine acknowledges that most laws that regulate speech will
inevitably reach some speech that is protected under the First Amendment,
and thus, in addition to leaving legislatures powerless, it would be
unreasonable to strike down every law that has even one potentially
impermissible application to protected speech. 41 In order to invalidate a law
under the overbreadth doctrine, therefore, “the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s
plainly legitimate sweep.” 42
Finally, if a statute restricts speech that concerns an entire topic, and if
there is hostility toward that topic, then the statute discriminates based on
content.43 Content-based discrimination must be subjected to a “least
restrictive means” test, also known as strict scrutiny. 44 Under a strict scrutiny
analysis, content-based statutes are presumed unconstitutional under the
First Amendment because they allow the government to distinguish between

MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010) (quoting Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504,
518 n.16 (Tex. 1995)). This is in contrast to a facial challenge, which is described as one where “no
application of the statute could be constitutional.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). If a
court finds that a statute is facially unconstitutional, the entire statute is invalidated. See Kreit, supra at
657.
40
See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 255 (2002); Machholz, 574 N.W.2d at 419.
41
See Linder, supra note 39.
42
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
43
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 431 (1996) (referring to “hostility toward ideas as such”);
see also Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–96 (1972) (first establishing the importance
of the content-based distinction). In Mosley, a postman challenged a Chicago ordinance that banned
picketing outside schools except for “peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.” Id. at
93. The postman had previously been picketing for months outside schools that he believed were engaging
in racial discrimination. Id. The Court found that the ordinance distinguished between content and
allowed those picketers with messages the city liked to picket, while others were prohibited. Id. at 94; see
also id. at 95 (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).
44
Sable Commc’n of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however,
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it
chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). Strict scrutiny is often seen as
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8, 17 (1972). However, the content-discrimination standard is still a vital tool in First Amendment
analysis. See e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“On a
theoretical level, it reflects important insights into the meaning of the free speech principle—for instance,
that content-based speech restrictions are especially likely to be improper attempts to value some forms
of speech over others, or are particularly susceptible to being used by the government to distort public
debate. On a practical level, it has in application generally led to seemingly sensible results. And, perhaps
most importantly, no better alternative has yet come to light.”) (internal citations omitted).
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favored and disfavored speech based on the ideas expressed. 45 The
presumption of unconstitutionality is rebuttable only by showing the statute
is narrowly tailored to serve a “compelling state interest.”46 A statute is
narrowly tailored if it employs the least restrictive means to achieve the
government’s compelling interest. 47 The government must satisfy this strict
scrutiny test in order to enact a statute that lawfully discriminates based on
the ideas or content of the speech. 48
The U.S. Supreme Court routinely strikes down content-based
restrictions on speech on the narrow tailoring or “least restrictive means”
prong of strict scrutiny. 49 According to the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
ACLU, “the purpose of the [least restrictive means] test is to ensure that
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is
important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished.”50
The above-mentioned three types of First Amendment challenges have
been recently proven successful in a number of different areas and
subjects51––sexual grooming of a minor being one of them. The next Part
45
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (striking down a conviction of a protestor
that burned an American flag at the Republican National Convention). As Justice William Brennan wrote,
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”
Id. at 414.
46
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790, 803–05 (2011) (striking down a 2005
California law banning the sale of certain violent video games to children without parental supervision,
finding that video games are protected speech and that the law was not narrowly tailored to the limited
purpose of preventing actual harm to a child); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 813–14, 827 (2000) (invalidating Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that
restricted cable channels communicating sexually explicit content to late-night hours, finding that, despite
the Government’s compelling interest, it was a content-based restriction that failed strict scrutiny).
47
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (“[A] court assumes that certain protected speech
may be regulated, and then asks what is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to achieve that
goal.”).
48
See Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813 (“If a statute regulates speech based on its content, it
must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.”).
49
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2421–23 (1996) (describing instances where the Court has struck down laws
based on the least restrictive means and narrow tailoring requirements). In United States v. Stevens, the
Supreme Court struck down Title 18, Section 48 of the U.S. Code, which criminalized the creation, sale,
or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of commercial gain. 559 U.S. 460,
464–65, 468 (2010). Because the law regulated communication based on content, the Court held that it
was presumptively invalid and found that the Government failed to meet its burden of rebutting that
presumption. Id. at 468, 481–82.
50
ACLU, 542 U.S. at 666.
51
See, e.g., David Orentlicher, The FDA’s Graphic Tobacco Warnings and the First Amendment,
389 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 204, 204–06 (2013) (tobacco industry successfully arguing that on-package
cancer warnings violated the First Amendment); Sam Gustin, How ExxonMobil and Airbnb Are Using
the First Amendment to Fight Regulation, MOTHERBOARD (July 1, 2016, 9:30 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nz73gz/how-exxonmobil-and-airbnb-are-using-the-first-
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describes a recent challenge to a Minnesota grooming law and highlights the
various arguments that were raised both in support of and against the law
under the First Amendment.
II. MINNESOTA V. MUCCIO
In November 2014, a father found inappropriate pictures on his fifteenyear-old son’s iPad. 52 The pictures showed a close-up of a female’s behind
in a thong, a close-up of a female’s genitals, and a female naked from the
neck to the waist. 53 Krista Ann Muccio, a woman who worked at his son’s
school cafeteria, sent pictures to the boy through Instagram. 54 The father
reported the photos to law enforcement and a search warrant subsequently
revealed that Muccio and the child engaged in sexually explicit
conversations and exchanged sexually explicit photographs. 55 The State
charged Muccio with two offenses: one count of felony communication with
a minor describing sexual conduct,56 and one count of felony possession of
pornographic work involving minors. 57 The electronic felony

amendment-to-fight-regulation [https://perma.cc/H8NG-Z64P] (noting that corporations have argued that
government regulation and fraud investigation violate their right to free expression); Sam Gustin,
Landmark Verizon ‘Net Neutrality’ Case Tests Open Internet Rules, TIME (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/09/09/landmark-verizon-net-neutrality-case-tests-open-internet-rules
[https://perma.cc/F5ZC-4D5N] (broadband industry challenging rules protecting net neutrality, claiming
a First Amendment right to control their networks); Eric Newcomer, Airbnb Sues Hometown San
Francisco to Block Rental Rules,
BLOOMBERG (June 27,
2016, 9:59 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-27/airbnb-is-suing-hometeown-san-francisco-toblock-rental-rules [https://perma.cc/65VM-MAHQ] (Airbnb challenging San Francisco’s law requiring
renters to register with the city as a violation of their free speech rights).
52
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914, 918–19 (Minn. 2017).
53
Id. at 918.
54
Id.
55
State v. Muccio (Muccio I), 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) review granted (Aug. 23,
2016), rev’d, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017).
56
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 919. The statute Muccio was charged under states:
A person 18 years of age or older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program,
computer network, computer system, an electronic communications system, or a
telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic device capable
of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the following acts, with the intent
to arouse the sexual desire of any person, is guilty of a felony . . .
MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added). The specific section under which she was
charged prohibits “engaging in communication with a child or someone the person reasonably
believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct . . . .” MINN. STAT. § 609.352
subd. 2a(2) (2009) (emphasis added).
57
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 919. This was allegedly in violation of Minnesota Statute § 617.247
subd. 4(a). Id.
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communication statute aims to prohibit grooming speech, and as a result, the
term “grooming statute” will be used when referring to this law. 58
A. In the Lower Courts
The district court held that the grooming statute 59 was unconstitutional,
finding that it was facially overbroad and thus a violation of the First
Amendment.60 The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
grooming statute violated the First Amendment because it criminalized too
much protected speech. 61 The appeals court further found that the statute
triggered strict scrutiny. 62
In reaching its decision, the appeals court first assessed whether the
prohibited grooming speech fell into one of three unprotected categories:
speech integral to criminal conduct, obscene speech, or child pornography. 63
First, the court found that criminalization of the speech violated the First
Amendment because the statute criminalized speech not directly linked to a
criminal sexual act. 64 The court explained that communication of explicit
material with an intent to arouse is one step removed from solicitation, and
thus even further removed from a future criminal act.65 As a result, the State
had shown “no more than a remote connection between speech that might
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.” 66
Second, the court determined that the obscenity exception was
inapplicable, finding that the statute criminalized speech not just limited to
obscene speech under United States v. Miller.67 The court disagreed with the
State’s argument that the statute’s “intent to arouse the sexual desire of any
person” requirement, combined with the requirement that the
communication is with a child, satisfied the Miller test.68 According to the
court, those elements did not limit the statute’s reach to communication that
58
See MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009). The statute prohibits an adult from engaging in
communication with a child if the communication relates to sexual conduct and is communicated with an
intent to arouse sexual desire. This includes grooming speech, which is the speech leading up to
solicitation of a sexual act.
59
MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2) (2009).
60
Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 153.
61
Id. See discussion on overbreadth supra notes 38–39.
62
Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 160.
63
Id. at 155–57.
64
Id. at 155–56. The State admitted that the statute reached speech prior to solicitation, one step
removed from criminal conduct. Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 156 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002)).
67
Id. at 156–57 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), which established a three-part
test for assessing whether material is obscene).
68
Id. at 157.
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“appeal[s] to the prurient interest” nor did it “exclude from the statute’s
ambit speech which has social value.” 69
Third, the court determined that the child pornography unprotectedspeech category was inapplicable. 70 While the State argued that the statute
could be analogized to child pornography statutes because the speech caused
harm to minors, the court found that children need not be depicted under the
Minnesota statute; there only needs to be a “communication . . . relating to
or describing sexual conduct.” 71 As a result, the policy justification behind
the criminalization of child pornography was inapplicable because children
do not even need to be present or involved in the speech prohibited by the
statute.72
Next, in assessing whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad,
the court found that the statute’s intent requirement—which was satisfied if
the adult had “the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”—was far
too broad.73 One consequence of this broad language was that
communication that occurred between two adults, and without intent to
affect a child, may have fallen within the statute’s ambit because the
prohibited speech only needed to be “relating to or describing sexual
conduct.” 74 Moreover, because the statute did not define “engaging,” 75 the
court found that it was “unclear whether a one-way communication would
be sufficient.”76
Finally, the court determined that the statute was a content-based
regulation and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. 77 The court first found
the State’s interest compelling, because preventing adults from engaging in
illegal sexual activity with children was a persuasive and substantial

69

Id.
Id.
71
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)) (emphasis added).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 158 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)).
74
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a(2) (2009)). The court determined that this broad
scope included many topics commonly found in pop culture related to sex in movies, books, and video
games. Id.
75
See supra note 56 for the text of the statute.
76
Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 158. For example, under the statute, if an adult published material on
Facebook with an intent to arouse “any person” and a child read and commented on the post, then the
adult would have “engaged in communication” with “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person.”
Id. Based on this construction of the statute, the court found several colorful examples to illustrate the
statute’s overbreadth, including a music video producer, film producer, and writer of young-adult fiction.
Id. The fact that these acts would be criminalized under the statute led the court to find that it was
overbroad. Id.
77
Id. at 160.
70
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governmental interest. 78 In determining whether the statute was narrowly
tailored, however, the court found that the statute was not the least restrictive
means to ensure children are protected from illegal sexual conduct. 79 While
the statute prohibited speech communicated with an intent to arouse an
individual’s sexual desires, that speech was not necessarily communicated
with any intent to engage a child in a sexual act. 80 Because the statute was
not narrowly tailored, therefore, the statute violated the First Amendment. 81
The State, unhappy with the court’s decision, appealed the case to the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court and
ruled that while the statute did apply to some protected speech, it was not
overbroad, and the facial challenge thus failed. 82 The Minnesota Supreme
Court first interpreted the plain language of the statute in order to determine
whether the speech was integral to criminal conduct and therefore
unprotected. The court then applied the Miller test to determine whether the
speech was obscene.
The court first interpreted the statute’s plain language by addressing
three disputed phrases within the statute: (1) “engaging in communication
with a child”; (2) “with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”;
and (3) “relating to or describing sexual conduct.” 83 The court interpreted the
first phrase—“engaging in communication with a child”—to mean “the adult
must take some affirmative act to specifically select or designate the child as
a recipient of the transmission,” 84 and therefore, the statute did not prohibit
non-targeted mass electronic communications, such as social media posts
that a child happened to view. 85 The court found that the second phrase—
“with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person”—included anyone,
not just the two individuals involved in the communication. 86 Lastly, in

78
Id. (“We agree, and the parties do not dispute, that the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting
this conduct. ‘The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral
instincts of a decent people.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)); see
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (“The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of
children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”).
79
Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d at 160.
80
Id. at 158–60.
81
Id. at 160.
82
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017).
83
Id. at 920–22 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009)).
84
Id. at 921.
85
Id. at 920–21.
86
Id. at 921–22.
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analyzing the third phrase—“relating to or describing sexual conduct”—the
court found that the prohibited communication could be related to anyone; it
did not need to describe or relate to sexual conduct involving either the child
or the adult.87 In sum, the court construed the statute’s plain language to mean
that it “prohibit[ed] an adult from participating in the electronic transmission
of information relating to or describing the sexual conduct of any person, if
the communication was directed at a child, and the adult sending the
communication acted with the specific intent to arouse the sexual desire of
any person.”88
Next, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that most of the speech
falling within the ambit of the statute would be unprotected speech either
because it was integral to criminal conduct or was obscene under Miller.89
Similarly to the lower court, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that, “when
grooming is done for the purpose of later using the child in sexual conduct,
it resembles solicitation of the child, and . . . falls outside First Amendment
protections.”90 The court decided that most of the speech prohibited by the
statute was integral to criminal conduct, and thus unprotected speech. 91
Lastly, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied Miller and concluded that
much of the criminalized speech would often be obscene and therefore
unprotected.92 Because the statute proscribed communication directed at a
child with the intent to arouse sexual desire, the court found that the speech
would most likely be “designed by the adult to arouse the child’s sexual
desire for the adult, or the adult’s sexual desire for the child.” 93 Sexually
explicit speech that is designed to cause sexual arousal is patently offensive
when an adult directs the speech at a child. 94 As a result, the court found that
most communications falling within the statute met all three prongs in the
Miller test.95 The court acknowledged that there would be some speech that
was protected speech, specifically speech that was non-obscene and did not
fall within another category of unprotected speech, such as speech integral
87

Id. at 922.
Id.
89
Id. at 926–27.
90
Id. at 924. The court analogized to the case of United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008). Id.
at 923–24. In Williams, the Supreme Court found that there is no First Amendment protection for offers
to engage in illegal transactions. 553 U.S. at 298–99. The Court in Williams also found that a federal
statute prohibiting the “pandering” of child pornography, which included offering or requesting to
transfer, sell, deliver, or trade the pornographic items, did not violate the First Amendment, even if the
person charged with “pandering” did not in fact possess child pornography to trade. Id. at 298–99, 300.
91
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 924–25.
92
Id. at 925–27.
93
Id. at 925–26.
94
Id. at 926.
95
Id. at 926–27.
88
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to criminal conduct or child pornography. 96 However, “the vast majority of
the statute’s applications” were constitutional restrictions on speech, and to
the extent protected speech was shown to fall within the statute, the court
held that challenges may go forward on an as-applied basis.97
The Supreme Court denied certiorari for this case in 2017, 98 and in
March of 2018, Krista Ann Muccio pled guilty to one count of felony
communication with a minor describing sexual conduct. 99 Muccio will face
time in prison for this conviction and the Minnesota courts have decided that
she was guilty. However, the question remains: Is the statute 100 a violation of
the First Amendment? Was the Minnesota Supreme Court incorrect in
upholding a law that is content-based, overbroad, and has the potential to
chill protected free speech? And is there a simple way to fix the current law
in place?
III. ANALYSIS
The next Part will discuss the significance of the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s ruling and will recommend new language for states interested in
passing grooming legislation. It will also argue that grooming speech should,
legally, be considered akin to solicitation speech, which provides a
constitutional rationale for upholding the rewritten statute.
A. The Errors and Unintended Consequences of Minnesota v. Muccio
This Section addresses the following three reasons why the statute
under which Muccio was charged should have been struck down as
unconstitutional: first, the statute is content-based and, as such, should have
been subject to strict scrutiny analysis; second, the court failed to apply the
“least restrictive means” test; and finally, the statute as written is actually a
regulation on the freedom of thought, and should therefore have been struck
down and rewritten.
First, the law proscribes speech “relat[ed] to or describing sexual
conduct,” 101 which makes the statute a content-based restriction. 102 The law
96

Id.
Id. at 927, 928–29.
98
Muccio v. Minnesota, 138 S. Ct. 328, 329 (2017).
99
See Nick Ferraro, Lunch Lady Who Argued Sexting With a 15-Year-Old Was Free Speech Pleads
Guilty, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 8, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/03/08/lunch-ladywho-argued-sexting-with-a-15-year-old-was-free-speech-pleads-guilty [https://perma.cc/Z6KP-7L9F].
100
MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009).
101
Id.
102
See Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) review granted (Aug. 23, 2016), rev’d,
890 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 328 (2017); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–12 (2000) (stating that the essence of a content-based regulation is that “[i]t
97
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is content-based because: (1) the law indicates that speech related to sexual
conduct is disfavored by the Minnesota legislature, and (2) the law restricts
expression because of a message or idea communicated. Communication
“relat[ed] to or describing sexual conduct” includes a wide array of
constitutionally protected literary, artistic, and musical work. For example,
the law would prohibit sharing songs online, such as Beyoncé’s Drunk in
Love103 and Katy Perry’s I Kissed A Girl.104 It encompasses middle school
textbooks related to sexual education and medical textbooks depicting sexual
organs, if they are accessed electronically. It includes content found in hit
television shows like 13 Reasons Why,105 Girls,106 The Office,107 and Stranger
Things.108 Even books like The Scarlet Letter,109 if accessed electronically,
would be included in this broad definition. Because of this, it is difficult to
argue that the statute is not a content-based restriction.
Content-based restrictions are due strict scrutiny, which requires a
compelling interest on the part of the state. The compelling interest of the
Minnesota legislature is to prevent illegal sexual conduct between adults and
children.110 Neither party disputed that the state has a compelling interest in
prohibiting this conduct, 111 and preventing the sexual abuse of children is a
legitimate goal that the statute aims to prohibit. 112 However, the legislature’s
‘focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners’”) (internal
citation omitted).
103
BEYONCÉ, DRUNK IN LOVE (Parkwood Entertainment, Columbia Records 2013) (“I’ve been
drinking, I’ve been drinking / I get filthy when that liquor get into me / I’ve been thinking, I’ve been
thinking / Why can’t I keep my fingers off it, baby?”) (lyrics available at https://genius.com/Beyoncedrunk-in-love-lyrics [https://perma.cc/5VUZ-CKQU]).
104
KATY PERRY, I KISSED A GIRL (Capitol Records 2008) (“I kissed a girl and I liked it / The taste
of her cherry chapstick / I kissed a girl just to try it / I hope my boyfriend don’t mind it”) (lyrics available
at
https://www.lyricsmode.com/lyrics/k/katy_perry/i_kissed_a_girl.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2X4NCZT]).
105
13 Reasons Why: The Second Polaroid (July Moon Productions, Kicked to the Curb Productions,
Anonymous Content, Paramount Television 2018) (depicting a sexual act and discussing consent and
rape culture).
106
Girls: Pilot (Apatow Productions, I Am Jenni Konner Productions, HBO Entertainment 2012)
(portraying sexual intercourse and other sexual acts).
107
The Office: Sexual Harassment (Deedle-Dee Productions, Reveille Productions, NBC Universal
Television Studios 2005) (discussing sexual harassment policies at work).
108
Stranger Things: Chapter Nine: The Gate (21 Laps Entertainment, Monkey Massacre 2016)
(containing a sexualized kiss between two teenagers).
109
See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850) (concerning a woman who
conceives a daughter through a sexual affair).
110
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914, 928 (Minn. 2017) (“The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious
crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of decent people.”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002)).
111
Id.
112
See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755–56 (1996)
(upholding a federal law permitting cable system operators to ban “indecent” or “patently offensive”
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goal of preventing the engagement of a child in a criminal sexual act is not
necessarily achieved by what the statute proscribes. As written, the statute
criminalizes speech made “with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any
person.”113 The statute does not criminalize speech made with the intent to
engage a child in sexual conduct. The Minnesota Supreme Court thus erred,
since it seemed to utilize the “intent to arouse” standard as a proxy for the
“intent to engage in sexual conduct with a child.” Those two intentions are
very different, however.114 Speech communicated with the “intent to arouse”
does not necessarily need to be made with any criminal intent to engage a
child in sexual conduct. 115
The Minnesota Supreme Court also erred by failing to apply the “least
restrictive means” test. 116 If the goal is to criminalize speech before it turns
into criminal conduct, the least restrictive means available would be to
criminalize speech that was communicated only with the intent to engage in
a criminal sexual act with a minor. Here, however, the speech criminalized
under the statute must only be made “with the intent to arouse the sexual
desire of any person.”117 Thus, the statute criminalizes more speech than
necessary—specifically, speech made with an intent to arouse oneself, but
without any intent to engage a child in sexual conduct.

speech on leased access channels, since protecting children from such speech is a compelling state
interest).
113
MINN. STAT. § 609.352 subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added).
114
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis begins with a discussion of why speech that is “integral
to criminal conduct” is unprotected speech. Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 923. Speech is integral to criminal
conduct, and thus unprotected, when it “is intended to induce or commence illegal activities, [such as]
conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298
(2008)). The court states that a defendant who engages in sexual communications with a child and has an
“intent to arouse” is usually involved in the “grooming process,” and “when grooming is done for the
purpose of later using the child in sexual conduct,” it is unprotected. Id. at 924. Here, the court construed
“intent to arouse” to mean “intent to use the child in sexual conduct”; however, this conflates two different
ideas. The “intent to arouse” means stimulation of oneself or of a child, while the “intent to use the child
in sexual conduct” means actually engaging the child for the purpose of engaging them in a sexual act.
115
The certiorari petition also highlighted this issue. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19–20,
Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d 914 (No. 17-209), 2017 WL 3405493 (“A text message from an older sister to
her younger sister that, ‘your boyfriend is really cute—you should totally sleep with him,’ relates to sexual
conduct and is intended to arouse the sexual desire of the younger sister for her boyfriend. Indeed, even
a message from a youth minister that says, ‘in marital sex, spouses participate in the very love of God,’
may be intended to arouse the sexual desires of young teens toward their future spouses while extolling
the virtues of abstinence until marriage. And an e-mail from a counselor to a teen questioning sexual
orientation could also fall within subdivision 2a(2)’s scope if it encourages the teen to acknowledge and
accept his or her sexual desires.”).
116
Instead, the court used an overbreadth test to assess whether the statute was substantially
overbroad and found that it was not. Muccio II, 890 N.W.2d at 929.
117
MINN. STAT. § 609.352, subd. 2a (2009) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court overlooked that this statute
implicates the freedom of thought. The statute’s specific-intent requirement
of “intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person” criminalizes sexual
thoughts that may have nothing to do with harming a child. 118 The
Constitution protects thoughts just like it protects speech, 119 and the
government may not “constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability
of controlling a person’s private thoughts.” 120 For decades, judges and
scholars have stressed that the First Amendment is meant to protect against
the government controlling our thoughts and right to think freely. 121 The right
to think is crucial to freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because “speech is the beginning of thought.”122 An individual’s
118
One might argue that narrowing the statute to only include “an intent to engage in a criminal
sexual act with a child” would not protect against adults merely trying to trigger the sexual arousal of a
child. The statute as written in Part III.B does not cover this behavior. This Comment’s argument for a
narrower intent requirement, and the statutory language in Part III.B, is based on the expressed interest
of the state in protecting against the sexual abuse of a child, not mere sexual arousal. However, in certain
situations, the intent to trigger the sexual arousal of a child may be harmful on its own, and thus an adult
intending to exploit a child by arousing the child would itself be offensive. If states have the broader goal
of wanting to protect against that kind of behavior, a more expansive intent requirement may be
appropriate. For example, in order to effectively criminalize the intent to arouse a child, the statute may
also be properly rewritten to prohibit “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of the child for the purpose of
exploitation” instead of “an intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person” as the Minnesota statute was
written.
119
See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 618 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Freedom to think
is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings
of the mind.”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937) (“[F]reedom [of thought] . . . is the
matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”).
120
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
121
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The First
Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit—a spirit that
demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of
identity.”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[F]reedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords
ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government.”); Eugene Volokh, Texas Court Strikes Down Ban on
Communications to Minors “That Relate[] to or Describe[] Sexual Conduct” Made with “Intent to
[Sexually]
Arouse”,
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Oct.
30,
2013,
6:39
PM),
http://volokh.com/2013/10/30/texas-court-strikes-ban-communications-minors-relate-describe-sexualconduct-made-intent-sexually-arouse [https://perma.cc/58PG-5ME8] (“First Amendment freedoms are
most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible
end.”) (internal citation omitted).
122
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). Without the freedom of thought, the
freedom of speech is meaningless because one can only communicate what they think. See Freedom of
Thought & The First Amendment, CTR. FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS,
http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/issues/first_amend_index.html [https://perma.cc/GSJ7-7BM7]. As a
result, by criminalizing the thoughts in one’s head, you are also threatening one’s First Amendment rights.
See id.
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thoughts in his head, however “salacious,” “murderous,” or
“discriminatory,” are his own and the law may only intervene when he acts
upon his thoughts.123 Therefore, this statute unconstitutionally prohibits both
protected speech and thought.
Critics might suggest that this analysis would make it impossible to
draft a grooming statute and that the “intent to arouse” language provides a
narrow enough range of speech under the statute. However, as explained
below, the statute can be easily revised to criminalize speech communicated
with an intent to engage a child in an illegal act by simply altering the intent
requirement.
B. How to Draft a Grooming Law in Line with the First Amendment
This Section suggests a model grooming statute based on two other
jurisdictions that have faced parallel issues. Legislatures in Texas 124 and
Oregon125 faced similar challenges to their grooming laws and courts in both
states struck down their statutes under the overbreadth analysis. 126 After
striking down the statutes, Texas127 and Oregon128 then amended their laws
to provide narrower constructions to ensure the statutes’ constitutionality.
To avoid lengthy litigation and a constitutional challenge, states should
avoid using the language that will fail strict scrutiny and may be construed
by courts as overbroad. State legislatures should avoid using the “intent to
arouse” requirement and should replace it with the “intent to engage in sexual
conduct with the child.” Using the Minnesota statute as an example, the
language of the statute could be amended as follows:

123

Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (striking down a Texas grooming law
because it violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment).
124
See id. The statute in question in Ex parte Lo contains language nearly identical to that found in
Minnesota’s grooming law. See id. at 17 n.23.
125
Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (striking down OR. REV.
STAT. § 167.057 (2015) as overbroad).
126
See supra note 39.
127
After the ruling in Ex parte Lo, the Texas legislature amended Texas Penal Code § 33.021 to
remove the overbroad “intent to arouse” language and replaced it with the “intent to commit an offense
listed in Article 62.001(5)(A), (B), or (K), Code of Criminal Procedure.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 33.021(b) (West 2015) (emphasis added). Articles 62.001(5)(A), (B), and (K) refer to a broad range of
criminal sexual acts with a minor. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.00 (West 2017).
128
After the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Powell’s Books, the Oregon legislature subsequently amended
§ 167.057 to remove the overbroad language “for the purpose of arousing and satisfying the sexual desires
of the person” and replaced it with “for the purpose of inducing the minor or purported minor to engage
in sexual conduct.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167.057 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
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Subd. 2a. Electronic solicitation of children. A person 18 years of age or
older who uses the Internet, a computer, computer program, computer network,
computer system, an electronic communications system, or a
telecommunications, wire, or radio communications system, or other electronic
device capable of electronic data storage or transmission to commit any of the
following acts, with the intent to arouse the sexual desire of any person with the
intent to engage in sexual conduct with the child, is guilty of a felony and may
be sentenced as provided in subdivision 4: . . .
(2) engaging in communication with a child or someone the person
reasonably believes is a child, relating to or describing sexual conduct.

By eliminating the “intent to arouse” language, and by requiring that an
individual act with an intent to engage the child in sexual conduct, the law
proscribes the intention to prey on a minor, instead of merely the sexual
thoughts inside an individual’s head. States interested in enacting grooming
legislation should therefore look to this amended statute for guidance. 129
C. Grooming Speech Should Be Classified as Unprotected Solicitation
Speech
When done effectively, grooming poses a greater danger and threat to
children than does mere solicitation. The analysis below explains how
grooming speech fits under the First Amendment’s solicitation doctrine.
By narrowing the statute and only criminalizing speech communicated
with an intent to engage in sexual conduct, grooming speech is more easily
classifiable as “integral to criminal conduct” because it is part of the
solicitation process. 130 Sexual abuse through grooming is a “process” and
more than a single “act” because grooming the child requires the adult to
alter the way a child thinks by building dependence, forming an emotional
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Repetitive behavior that causes harm over time, like constantly desensitizing a child to
pornography, can be considered similar to other pattern offenses such as stalking and harassment. To
prosecute these types of offenses, the state must show a “course of conduct,” which means a pattern of
conduct comprised of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, that evidences a continuity of
purpose. See “Pattern of Conduct” Examples, U. N.M. J UD. EDUC. CTR., http://jec.unm.edu/
education/online-training/stalking-tutorial/pattern-of-conduct-examples [https://perma.cc/DW2J-G8CD]
(stating that while one verbally abusive phone call might be emotionally jarring, that alone may not be
the basis of a criminal harassment prosecution; at some point after two or three calls, a pattern starts to
emerge). Although not present in the model statute, and beyond the scope of this Comment, states may
consider adding this “course of conduct” language to provide a narrower version of the statute.
130
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions
are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55
(1982) (stating that solicitation, as “an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit,” may
be prohibited).

20

114:1 (2019)

Minnesota v. Muccio

connection, and gaining the child’s trust to prevent resistance. 131 When a
sexual predator grooms a child for a sexual act, he goes through many steps
to desensitize the child to sexually explicit images and conduct. 132 As a result
of the child’s dependence, sexual grooming poses a heightened risk of the
predator successfully abusing the child. 133 For example, consider a predator
that solicits a sexual act from a child he has never met. Now, consider a
predator that builds a child’s trust and respect for months, and then solicits
the child for a sexual act. It is more likely that the predator will be successful
in the second scenario, because the child thinks he or she is safe and trusts
the adult.134 Because the grooming increased the likelihood of the predator’s
success and contributed to the horrible result of a child’s abuse, the grooming
should be considered part of the solicitation. Grooming, in other words, can
be thought of as a drawn-out solicitation process—when sexual grooming
begins, the intention to exploit the child begins. By classifying grooming
speech as solicitation, therefore, a court or a legislature would not be
expanding the scope of unprotected speech. Instead, it would be classifying
certain types of speech as solicitation because they are dangerously integral
to the solicitation process.
This classification would therefore allow legislatures to pass grooming
laws regulating this type of communication while not expanding the First
Amendment doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Muccio, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to
recognize that the Minnesota grooming statute is a content-based law that
does not pass strict scrutiny. The court overlooked that the statute is
overbroad, and that it criminalizes sexual thoughts by criminalizing
communication with an “intent to arouse.” The court should instead have
struck down the statute and compelled the legislature to amend it. States that
plan to enact grooming statutes should avoid potential constitutional
challenges by drafting legislation that is narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest of protecting minors from sexual abuse. If properly
drafted, grooming statutes should be upheld under the “integral to criminal
conduct” exception because grooming should be considered an extended
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Brief of Amicus Curiae, Minn. Coal. Against Sexual Assault at 13, Muccio I, 881 N.W.2d 149
(Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (No. A15-1951), 2016 WL 3924135.
132
See supra note 16.
133
See supra notes 16–18; Cory Jewell Jensen, Patti Bailey & Steve Jensen, Selection, Engagement
and Seduction of Children and Adults by Child Molesters, 36 PROSECUTOR 3, 42–43 (2002) (describing
the advanced techniques child molesters use to prey on children).
134
See supra notes 16–18.
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solicitation process. The passage of narrowly tailored grooming laws will
provide better protection for children, while also providing protection for the
freedom of speech and thought––all of great importance.
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